

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**WHAT SHOULD BE THE UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARDS BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA?**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, primarily ballistic missiles, put at risk the security of our nation, its people, deployed military forces, friends, and allies. The threat of ballistic missiles is especially true and prevalent in Northeast Asia. China and North Korea are seen as the top nations in the region when it comes to ballistic missiles. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan do not trust the intentions of China and North Korea and seek agreements to ensure their security. Since Northeast Asia plays an important role in the United States (U.S.) economic and security well being, the U.S. has been and will continue to develop and deploy Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) assets into the region. However, the U.S. policy to deploy BMD in Northeast Asia will affect the interests and security of the region as well as those of the U.S.. Therefore, how should the U.S. proceed with BMD in the region? This Strategy Research Project provides an analysis of China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan's concerns and interests towards the U.S. policy providing us a better understanding of the region and how to proceed with BMD in order to build a stronger defense for the U.S., its friends, and allies.

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WHAT SHOULD BE THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA?

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by rogue nations is an issue that jeopardizes the security of our nation, people, deployed military forces, friends, and allies. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the world has become more unpredictable and volatile rather than predictable and peaceful. The instability in some countries and regions of the world has increased the interest of insurgents and extremists in obtaining WMD and the means to deliver them, including ballistic missiles, in order to coerce or topple the governments within their countries. To many nations and countries, ballistic missiles are an inexpensive and effective means to overcome an adversary's air defense system without having to use manned aircraft, lose trained personnel, and damage costly aircrafts. Missiles also require less maintenance, training, and logistics than manned aircraft. Ballistic and cruise missiles can also be armed with conventional or non-conventional warheads; even the limited use of these weapons could be devastating to any country or nation and their people. The United States, as the only global power, is a prime target for these players as they seek to destabilize the United States and its interests abroad through either the employment or threat of employment of WMD. Ballistic missiles, with the capability to deliver nuclear, biological, and chemical war heads cause significant anxiety in the United States and abroad.

President George W. Bush has stated that the mission for missile defense is to protect all fifty states, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies against ballistic missile attacks.¹ The September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States reprints the following quote from President Bush taken from his speech at West Point, New York, on 1 June 2002,

"The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike nations...They (our enemies) want the capability to blackmail U.S., or harm U.S., or harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power."²

President Bush alludes here to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the capability of our enemies to use this technology to inflict great harm and affect United States interests both abroad and at home. The United States must therefore deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense. However, this is a politically charged and complex decision that will be based on many issues, including technological limitations, budget constraints, the threat of WMD

employment and their means of delivery, and international politics. I will attempt to demonstrate the vital importance of BMD policy to the U.S and the countries of Northeast Asia, including China, North Korea, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. In this paper, I will discuss the threat of ballistic missiles in Northeast Asia, primarily from China and North Korea, their effect upon the security of our friends and allies in the region, and the U.S. policy and strategy for developing and deploying a BMD system within the region.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the U.S. policy concerning missile defense affects the interests and possibly the security of the Northeast Asia and to provide a recommendation as to how to proceed with BMD in order to build a stronger defense for the U.S., its friends, and allies.

BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The threat of ballistic missiles in Asia was not the impetus behind the United States development and deployment of Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) and the eventual development and deployment of a Global Missile Defense (GMD). Rather, the decision was due in large part to the deployment of SCUDs to Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union in 1988 to 1990; the SCUD launches between Iraq and Iran; the Iranian missile problem faced by the United States as it attempted to maintain an open and "free" Persian Gulf; and the actual employment of theater ballistic missiles (TBM) against the United States and its allies during the Gulf War.³ It was not until 1995 and 1996, when China conducted missiles tests off the Taiwan coast,⁴ and in 1998, when North Korea launched the Taepo Dong-1 (a three-stage, medium-range ballistic missile/space launch vehicle) that BMD deployment in Asia became a U.S. concern.⁵ The Taepo Dong-1 flew dangerously close to Japan and into the Japanese archipelago, a distance of over 1,000 miles. These examples of the employment of TBM's provided supporting arguments for the United States position that the TMD program is driven by the threat of the proliferation of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to United States forces, and its allies in Northeast Asia.⁶

WHAT IS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE?

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology has grown and will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. The proliferation of missile technology has made it relatively easy for terrorists and insurgents in unstable countries/regions to obtain WMD. In Asia, countries such as China and North Korea are developing more sophisticated missile designs, including missiles capable of reaching the United States. Additionally, these countries may develop the capability

to pair chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons with these ballistic missiles that could then be used against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies.

We constantly hear the terms Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Global Missile Defense (GMD), Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GBMD) system and Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Many wonder what these are and how they differ. BMD is a term used for all systems employed to defend against intercontinental and ballistic missiles of all types and ranges. BMD encompasses both GMD and TMD.

GMD is a system that depends on the synergistic effect of all the BMD systems to create a defensive “umbrella” against the use of ballistic missiles. It is designed to intercept and destroy the ballistic missile in one of its three phases: boost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. Boost phase is the portion of flight immediately after launch; midcourse phase is the longest part of the missile flight and begins when the missile leaves the earth’s atmosphere; and the terminal occurs when the missile’s warhead re-enters the earth’s atmosphere and heads toward its designated target. The GBMD system focuses on defending the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (in excess of 5,000 km) and is referred to as an Upper-tier system.⁷ Upper-tier systems are designed to intercept missiles while they are still above the atmosphere (midcourse phase). GMD will consist of the GBMD system and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system which are designed to defend the United States, but also the systems in TMD.

TMD is often misunderstood, because of the term “theater.” Many believe that TMD will protect an entire “Theater of Operations” or “Area of Responsibility (AOR),” but this is not the case. Rather, TMD is intended to be employed in a theater, such as Central Command, European Command, or Pacific Command, for protection of the forces or assets within that AOR. TMD is primarily employed to defend against short-range and theater range (up to 4,000 to 5,000 Km) ballistic missiles.⁸ TMD is also referred to as a Lower-tier system. Lower-tier systems such as PATRIOT and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense attempt to intercept and destroy the shorter range missiles as they are in their terminal phase.

Both Upper and Lower-tier systems are needed in order to create a “family of systems”, when deployed, are mutually supportive and overcome each other’s limitations. BMD systems are inherently defensive in nature and are designed to deter countries such as China and North Korea from using their ballistic missiles to achieve their political and military objectives while protecting U.S. personnel deployed overseas, our allies, and airports and seaports of embarkation/debarkation.

THE NORTHEAST ASIA THREAT

When discussing the threat in Northeast Asia, the countries of China and North Korea come to mind. China – with its huge army, weapon arsenal, rapid economic growth, and political growth in terms regional power and influence – is perhaps the key to the future of the Northeast Asia region. China has also made known its aspirations of some day reuniting Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. Additionally, North Korea – with its secluded, totalitarian regime; its military; and its recent assertion that it has become a nuclear power – is the country most distrusted in the region. North Korea has also made it known that it aspires to unite the Korean Peninsula, but on its own terms.

In Northeast Asia, memories of past aggression, invasion, and occupation continue to haunt the region. Both China and North Korea distrust Japan, after Japan invaded and occupied their countries in the late nineteenth century (an occupation that lasted until the end of World War II). This feeling of distrust and unfriendly sentiment is on the rise even though the preponderance of the population was not alive during the time of occupation.⁹ China deploys missiles aimed at Taiwan because it does not want Taiwan to be an independent country and tries to develop weapons to counter the U.S. forces that may assist in the defense of Taiwan. The development of China's military and North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program has motivated Japan to increase its security measures to protect its sovereignty.¹⁰ The distrust and misgivings that each of these countries have for one another has accelerated into a "miniature arms race."

CHINA

China's first strategic priority is economic development. Close behind that is preserving sovereignty and maintaining territorial integrity.¹¹ China has a very keen sense of nationalism that many analysts believe is overwhelming their political sense and views on communism. The return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 have only helped enhance this sense of nationalism. This leaves Taiwan as the only "Chinese territory" yet to be consolidated under Chinese rule.

China is a world-class developer and producer of nuclear and non-nuclear armed ballistic missiles that are designed to help them achieve strategic and regional military goals.¹² Beijing has also been accused of supplying missile technology and transfers to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.¹³ China is estimated to have over 800 Short Range Ballistic Missiles of which 100 to 150 are nuclear capable missiles (they are currently conventionally armed) aimed at Taiwan. They also possess a significant number of Medium

Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) that can also be armed with conventional or nuclear war heads.¹⁴ Japan is well in range of both the MRBMs and IRBMs. China is also estimated to have 18 to 20 ICBMs, each armed with a nuclear warhead.¹⁵ The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that China has deployed 300 nuclear warheads in land-based, silo-launched ballistic missiles ; submarine-launched missiles ; mobile missiles; and free-fall bombs for deployment by bomber aircraft.¹⁶

The relationship between the U.S. and China is the best it has ever been in the recent past. One of the key factors of the U.S.-Sino relationship is the status of Taiwan. The U.S. is committed, by bilateral agreement (the Taiwan Relations Act of April 1979), to assist in the defense of Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack and/or invasion. However, under the current Bush administration, the U.S. has reassured China that it does not support an independent Taiwan and that it will not assist Taiwan militarily to obtain its independence.¹⁷ This has helped ease tensions between China and the U.S. China has also adopted a more patient “wait and see attitude” towards its goals of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. The reasons for this attitude change are not only the U.S. stated position towards Taiwan’s independence, but also the increased economic dependence of Taiwan on China, “measured in billions of dollars in cross-Strait trade ... and as much as one hundred billion dollars in Taiwanese accumulated investment on the mainland.”¹⁸ Also, a great number of Taiwanese citizens (estimated in the hundreds of thousands) live on the Chinese mainland.¹⁹

China has become a key and important player in the multilateral talks with North Korea concerning the nuclear crisis. China has a vested interest in North Korea’s nuclear program. If North Korea continues with its nuclear program and begins to export nuclear weapons or the materials to build them, it may force the U.S. to act either multilaterally or unilaterally invade and topple the North Korean regime. The collapse of the North Korean regime could lead to a mass exodus of refugees into China, something the Chinese government could not financially handle and would require large sums of money from regional actors to help assist and rebuild a unified and stable Korea. The result will inevitably be decreased capital flows into the Chinese economy.²⁰ China would also not want the U.S. to act militarily since occupation of North Korea would put U.S. military on the Chinese border.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea’s primary national interest is the survival of its regime under Chairman Kim Jong IL. Its second interest is to obtain foreign aid in the form of food, money, and energy. Some estimates put the North Korean death toll from starvation at over two million people over

the past four years.²¹ The third national interest is re-unification with South Korea on its own terms.

North Korea has become the biggest seller of ballistic missile technology and ballistic missiles in the world. For the past twenty years, North Korea has made strenuous efforts to market both its ballistic missiles and the technology to produce them to a wide range of states including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.²² The sale of missile technology is the means by which North Korea has generated capital for its moribund economy and for the research and development of WMD.

North Korea possesses the largest ballistic missile force in the developing world and is on the verge of deploying space launch vehicles and ICBMs that could eventually threaten the continental U.S.²³ As of July 2004, North Korea is believed to have produced between 1,150-1,350 ballistic missiles of all types.²⁴ In 2002 North Korea announced to the world that it was pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program for the production of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Pyongyang stated that it has a right to produce nuclear weapons, because of the threat of attack from the U.S.²⁵ During 2002-03; the North Korea has directly and indirectly threatened to either deploy or test nuclear weapons.²⁶ In February 2005 North Korea officially announced that they have nuclear weapons.

Some (predominately diplomats and journalists in Asia and Europe) blame the current Bush administration for the ongoing nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia. In particular, they point out the "hostile posture of the Bush administration toward North Korea... the U.S. adoption of preemption, its designation of North Korea as a member of an axis of evil, and the president's own expressed personal loathing for Kim Jong IL."²⁷ Because of these actions and statements, they believe that North Korea will be forced to abandon the conciliatory route with its world neighbors and seek nuclear options.²⁸ China (for reason's stated above) has become a key player in the attempted negotiations with North Korea. Japan has publicly condemned North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Japan made changes in its security policy and stated that it would support and participate in a preemptive attack against North Korea if it felt missile strikes were imminent.²⁹ The country most affected with the actions of North Korea is South Korea. Initially South Korea ignored the actions of North Korea, even when they tested launched missiles during South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun inauguration in 2003. President Roh even went so far as telling the U.S., not North Korea, to show restraint.³⁰ However, more recently the Roh government has changed its policy and has publicly stated through its military that North Korea is the principal threat to the security and stability of South Korea.³¹

UNITED STATES POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENSE

There has been no debate over the deployment of TMD systems for the defense of our forces. Lower-tier TMD is deployed as a standard organic force package capability to all U.S. Army deployed forces. In the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, published in December 2002, one of the U.S.'s three pillars of its strategy for combating WMD is "Strengthening Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation".³² The document states that:

The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles.³³

Therefore, the U.S. will develop and deploy a TMD and GMD in order to ensure the protection of its interests (at home and abroad), military forces, and allies. To execute this policy, the U.S. has entered into various cooperative and bilateral agreements for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and protection of our national interests as mentioned in the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*:

A few states are dedicated proliferators (of WMD and ballistic missiles), whose leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and improve their WMD and **delivery capabilities**, which directly threaten the United States, U.S. forces overseas, and/or our friends and allies. Because each of these regimes is different, we will pursue country specific strategies that best enable U.S. and our friends and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against WMD and **missile threats** from each of them.³⁴ (My emphases)

However, the sale or transfer of these capabilities is the issue, according to Dr. Brad Roberts, a member of the Institute for Defense Analysis: "The decisions surrounding the future sale or transfer of these systems to our friends and allies will have strategic-level political-military implications."³⁵ The sale of the U.S. PATRIOT TMD systems to Taiwan elicited strong objections and threats from China and North Korea. The procurement of PATRIOT and the bilateral agreement to develop and deploy TMD capabilities with Aegis Cruisers sold by the United States to Japan also met with strong disapproval, primarily from North Korea. South Korea voices disapproval of these sales since it believes that these actions are counter-productive in future re-unification talks with North Korea.

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND COOPERATIVE AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

JAPAN

Japan's security and prosperity is dependent on its alliance with the U.S.³⁶ Japan's 2003 Defense White Paper, which was prepared by the Japan Defense Agency and approved by its Cabinet in August 2003, provided new guidance for updating Japanese defense planning and posture. The document makes it clear that all defense planning, force posture, and equipment planning - as well as overall procurement - are now primarily focused on defense against the threats of ballistic missiles and terrorism.³⁷ In the current Bush-Koizumi era, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has increased, both to the U.S. as the provider of Japanese domestic security, and to Japan as the primary strategic base of U.S. activities in the region.³⁸

North Korea, with its TBMs and the capability to target Japan, is without a doubt the most dangerous and immediate threat to Japan's security. This threat has heightened the security worries of Japan and has reminded the Japanese government that its security in regards to North Korea rests with the United States and missile defense.

Under a 1975 agreement, Japan is committed to providing air defense for U.S. bases.³⁹ Japan and the U.S. see TMD as an extension of this agreement, and the latter has procured the Patriot PAC-2 missile systems, and in the future will procure PAC -3 PATRIOT systems from the U.S.. PAC - 3 PATRIOT provides Japan with an enhanced initial Lower-tier TBM capability. Since 1998, U.S. and Japan have conducted joint research to improve components of Raytheon's Aegis ship-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and Japan has modified its export laws to allow for greater co-operation. The two nations plan to conduct flight tests of the enhanced SM-3 starting in 2005.⁴⁰ U.S. and Japan announced that defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, will modify one Japanese Aegis destroyer so it will be able to serve in a GMD role with the SM-3 interceptor.

SOUTH KOREA

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 established South Korea's only binding bilateral defense treaty. South Korea is also a participant in a multilateral defense agreement with sixteen other nations. Under United Nations auspice, the sixteen nations have pledged to assist South Korea in case of a North Korea invasion.

South Korea's primary threat is North Korea. The nature of this threat has altered since South Korea established diplomatic relations with China (in 1992) and the former Soviet Union (in 1990).⁴¹ However, the degree of North Korea's economic problems and its failure to become

an accepted member of the international community meant that the possibility of North Korean aggression against South Korea can not be ignored.

The current demographics in Korea are that of a younger generation, which only knows about the Korean War through its school's history books. This generation sees the U.S. as a roadblock to re-unification with the North. They also see the North Korean nuclear violation of bilateral agreements with the U.S. as a byproduct of President George W. Bush's hard line policy towards the North. Meanwhile, South Korea's relationship with China has grown politically and economically. Since 1995, China has grown in importance to South Korean imports and exports markets, almost to the point that it does as much commerce with South Korea as the U.S.

In regards to the missile threat posed by North Korea to South Korea, the North Koreans have not accepted a U.S. request to become a cooperative member for the development and deployment of a regional TMD system. In 1999 South Korea's Minister of Defense, Chun Yong Tack stated: "Pursuing the TMD is not an effective countermeasure against North Korean missiles. It can also arouse concern from neighboring countries."⁴² South Korea is simply not concerned about the North's ballistic missiles capability. Rather, its primary concern is with the hundreds of artillery pieces that are in range of Seoul.

TAIWAN

The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States proclaims that in order for a country to be recognized as a nation-state it must have "...a defined territory, a permanent population, and a government capable of entering into relations with other states."⁴³ Taiwan fulfills all of these requirements; however, China does not agree, and sees Taiwan as one of its "provinces" on the basis of the Chinese Civil War that ended over fifty years ago.⁴⁴ China has gone so far as to threaten the use of force to "re-claim" Taiwan despite urgings from the U.S. not to do so. During a visit to Washington D.C. in April 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji pointedly reiterated that China would never renounce the use of force, despite the fact that Taiwan does not constitute a threat to China's security in any way.⁴⁵

Taiwan is located in a very important strategic location near major international sea trade routes. It has a vast economy with a large trade relationship with the U.S., Taiwan is the seventh largest market for U.S. exports and important trading partner.⁴⁶ The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 obligates the U.S. to have sufficient military capabilities in the region to assist Taiwan in case of an attack that would put its security at risk.

China's contention that Taiwan belongs to the mainland and that this issue is internal in nature is what puts the safety and security of Taiwan to the forefront of the Northeast Asia regional security situation. A U.S. Department of Defense Report states that "...China views its growing conventionally armed ballistic missiles as a potent military and political weapon to influence Taiwan's populace and their leaders."⁴⁷ According to Dr. Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst and Asian Security Expert for the Center for Defense Information, China has approximately two hundred short and medium range ballistic missiles deployed across the Taiwan Strait.⁴⁸ However, as mentioned previously, China's attitudes towards the reunification of Taiwan have been tempered recently. Today, the relationship between the U.S. and China is at an all time high, with China becoming a strong economic and political player in the international community.

ANALYSIS

China's opposition to TMD is primarily political. China views the U.S. sale of Lower-tier TMD systems to Taiwan as both a blatant interference in internal Chinese affairs and a violation of its sovereignty. China is also concerned that the acquisition of Upper-tier GMD systems could embolden the Taiwanese independence movement. China has the perception that the selling of Upper-tier GMD systems to Taiwan is tantamount to the creation of a U.S.-Taiwan military alliance. Politically, China is wary of U.S. intentions towards Taiwan despite the reassurance that it does not support Taiwan's desire for independence.

The deployment of TMD in Japan, although less worrisome to Chinese officials than the issue of Taiwan, is another Chinese concern. Because of its limited capabilities (point defense), China considers Lower-tier TMD to be a true "defensive capability," and thus, does not oppose Japan's acquisition or deployment of these systems.⁴⁹ China does, however, oppose Japanese development of an Upper-tier GMD, in particular, the mainland fears the development of a sea based Upper-tier capability on an Aegis cruiser, which could assist in the defense of Taiwan.⁵⁰

North Korea is strongly against the deployment of any U.S. TMD in the region. U.S. and Japan have made clear that the deployed TMD systems from their countries are designated specifically to defeat the North Korean ballistic missile threat. With its economy in shambles, North Korea has used the threat of ballistic missiles to coerce attention and seek aid from countries within the region. If South Korea were to join the U.S. and Japan in the development and deployment of TMD capabilities, North Korea would see one of its primary means, other than the export of ballistic missiles, of obtaining aide and political leverage disappear.

China and North Korea also see the deployment of U.S. TMD as a precursor to the development and employment of a U.S. GMD in the region. This, of course, would have major consequences for both countries, because it would negate their ability to launch an offensive attack against the U.S., its friends, and its allies should the need arise.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

Any decision made regarding the development and deployment of TBM in Northeast Asia will have a profound effect on Sino-U.S. relations. Although the purpose of U.S. missile defense in the region is to prevent the first strike capabilities of rogue states like North Korea, it has been viewed by China as an attempt to thwart Chinese influence by altering the balance of power in the region. Thus, it is essential that the United States make clear that its missile defense is not intended to threaten Chinese regional hegemony.

I believe that the U.S. must continue engagement with China through a wide spectrum of cooperative agreements, commercial dealings, and inclusiveness. The United States support for China's membership in the World Trade Organization helped to foster friendship between China and the U.S. We must continue to include China in discussions concerning regional issues such as the future of the Korean Peninsula. This cooperative dialogue can help build Chinese trust towards the U.S. and its allies in the region. It will also give China the respect it is looking for as a global strategic actor. The U.S. should cease the sale of TMD systems to Taiwan, thereby showing a good sign of faith with China, assuring them of our intentions in regards to Taiwan, and dissuading the deployment of more ballistic missiles across the straits. Most importantly, the U.S. should continue support of the Taiwan Relations Act. The U.S. can leverage the TMD assets that are in the region (i.e. South Korea and Japan) to carry out the U.S. obligation to the Taiwan Relations Act without deploying TMD into Taiwan or selling Taiwan this upgraded capability. Sea based TMD assets can quickly deploy and be employed in defense of Taiwan immediately. This, I believe, will send a clear message to China that we want a relationship of mutual trust and respect, but we also stand by our position that the people of Taiwan should ultimately have the final say in determining their future. Simultaneously we must ensure that Taiwan understands that the U.S. does not support their desires to become an independent country and that we will not help them militarily to obtain their independence.

I recommend the U.S. continue its cooperative agreement with Japan in the development and deployment of TMD. The U.S. should also continue attempts to demonstrate to South Korean leaders that many benefits can be accrued through the development of TMD in their country. The U.S., Japan, and South Korea should continue to include China in all matters

pertaining to security in Northeast Asia, particularly in discussions where North Korea is concerned. China's influence is of great assistance in our efforts to dissuade North Korea from using its ballistic missile capabilities.

As the sole remaining hegemonic power, the United States has a large responsibility to lead the world, and must weigh each decision in regards to both its own security and stability and that of others. The ways in which the U.S. decides to employ its military and economic power will affect everyone. The deployment or sale of ballistic missile defense systems by the United States within the Northeast Asia region is an example of this and will have long-term strategic implications. It is clear the deployment and sale of ballistic missile defense systems in Northeast Asia is due to the missile buildup and proliferation within the region, primarily by China and North Korea. The deployment of BMD in Northeast Asia will alter the extremely sensitive and fragile security relationships that have been cultivated and currently exist. The U.S. policy must weigh the security implications on the one hand, and the stability within the Northeast Asia region on the other. The deployment of ballistic missile defense systems will encounter mixed reactions from China, North Korea, and Japan.

The United States must continue to field TMD capabilities in Northeast Asia or regional confidence in the U.S. will diminish. It is essential that the U.S. takes necessary action to shield our friends and allies from ballistic missile attack. The ultimate aim of BMD is to enhance security and regional stability, not to cause destabilization. I am confident that the U.S. can deploy TMD in the region without risking major regional conflict with China or North Korea.

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ENDNOTES

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